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I. Introduction and Summary 
 
The Open Internet movement began as a means of protecting consumer welfare in cyberspace. 
The Federal Communications Commission’s Internet Policy Statement, first adopted in 2005, 
emphasized that consumers should have access to the lawful Internet content of their choice, to 
run applications and use services of their choice, to connect the devices of their choice to the 
network, and to benefit from competition among broadband and app providers.1 Then-FCC 
Chairman Michael Powell introduced these themes at a policy speech in which he emphasized 
that “empowering consumers” was “critical to unlocking the vast potential of the broadband 
Internet.”2 Consumer choice originally was, and always should be, the guiding principle for 
policymakers when determining broadband policy.  
 
But a funny thing happened on the path from idea to implementation. The Commission shifted 
its focus away from consumers and toward edge providers. When President Obama pushed the 
Commission to reclassify broadband providers as Title II common carriers, he emphasized the 
need to protect a “level playing field” for edge providers and to reduce barriers for the 
hypothetical “next Facebook” – themes that are echoed in the Commission’s recent net 
neutrality order. The order emphasizes the risk that broadband providers might interfere 
anticompetitively in upstream markets for Internet-based content and applications. The 
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Commission explained that rules were necessary because broadband providers have “the 
economic power to restrict edge-provider traffic and charge for the services they furnish edge 
providers,”3 which might “reduce the rate of innovation at the edge.”4 
 
While many might assume that, in theory, what’s good for Netflix is good for consumers, the 
reality is more complex. To protect innovation at the edge of the Internet ecosystem, the 
Commission’s sweeping rules reduce the opportunity for consumer-friendly innovation 
elsewhere, namely by facilities-based broadband providers. Consumers in Chile recently felt 
the real-world impact of this tradeoff, as that nation’s telecommunications regulator applied 
similar rules to outlaw wireless plans that included free access to selected online services such 
as Facebook, Wikipedia, or Twitter.5 These wildly popular plans were aimed at prepaid 
customers and those with older phones, who could not afford, or otherwise did not want to 
purchase, a traditional unlimited-access wireless plan. Now, those customers are limited to 
purchasing a more expensive traditional plan, or none at all. Like the archetypal village in 
Vietnam, regulators felt they had to destroy consumer choice in order to save it. 
 
Thus the Open Internet order allows the FCC to deprive consumers of services they want, in 
order to protect edge provider markets. Advocates have asked the agency to do just that with 
regard to two related policy issues: usage-based pricing and zero-rated services. Despite strong 
arguments that these alternative business models can enhance competition and consumer 
choice, many net neutrality advocates nevertheless have called for rules prohibiting these 
practices and limiting consumers to a homogenous “dumb pipe” broadband service. 
Ominously, the FCC has responded with inquiries targeting AT&T’s Sponsored Data and Data 
Perks, T-Mobile’s Binge On, and Comcast’s Stream TV programs for further scrutiny. While 
Chairman Tom Wheeler has stated that these inquiries do not constitute an “investigation” or 
“an enforcement,” they nonetheless are likely to put a damper on Internet providers’ efforts to 
meet evolving consumer demand though zero-rating and sponsored data programs.  The 
Commission’s next steps in this inquiry, and its response to advocates’ continuing pressure to 
impose a uniform “dumb pipe” model on the broadband industry, may determine how far the 
agency will go to sacrifice consumer choice out of fear that consumer preferences may 
somehow harm Internet-based edge provider companies. 
 
II. Open Internet, Closed Mind (to Broadband Innovation) 
 
The Open Internet order imposes structural rules that limit broadband providers’ ability to offer 
differentiated services, even in partnership with upstream edge providers. Embedded in these 
rules is an unjustified bias in favor of existing broadband service models. The 2010 rules made 
this quite explicit: “These rules are generally consistent with, and should not require significant 
changes to, broadband providers’ current practices, and are also consistent with the common 
understanding of broadband Internet access service as a service that enables one to go where 
one wants on the Internet and communicate with anyone else online.”6 In the 2015 rules, the 
Commission seems willing to entertain the notion that some innovation is permissible within 
the broadband space, cabined by its awkward and amorphous “no unreasonable 
interference/disadvantage” standard.7 But it has also emphasized the need to “protect” and  
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“preserve” the “Open Internet,” rhetoric that suggests a bias toward the status quo. Indeed, 
homogenization of the broadband product seems to be the obvious and intended result of the 
Commission’s decision to re-label Internet service providers as “common carriers.” 
 
But this assumption about the need for a homogenized broadband experience is at odds with an 
increasingly heterogeneous customer base. Some of us are light users, and some are heavy. 
Some visit many websites, and some only use a handful on a regular basis. Some consumers 
cannot justify paying high prices for a mobile plan that largely duplicates the access they 
already have at home or at work, but they might pay less for access to a handful of services. 
And some may not wish to pay for content, but they would gladly enjoy it if the content 
provider wished to give it to consumers for free. In short, a “one-size-fits-all” broadband model 
is ill-fitted to today’s diverse user population. 
 
Given this evolution, the Commission’s imprimatur of approval for “current practices” at one 
moment in time is myopic and potentially harmful. As the market becomes saturated and 
consumer tastes diversify, providers should innovate to deliver increasing value to customers 
inadequately served by the traditional model.8 Christopher Yoo, a member of the Free State 
Foundation Board of Academic Advisors, has explained that companies often test new business 
models without a definitive understanding of the new model’s benefits or drawbacks. Instead 
they rely on a trial-and-error process to identify better methods of delivering value to 
consumers.9 To protect consumer welfare in the Internet ecosystem, it is insufficient to promote 
innovation simply among edge providers; the Commission must recognize the value of 
innovation in broadband service markets as well. 
 
As I have discussed in depth elsewhere,10 international markets are vividly demonstrating the 
value of broadband-level innovation. In Latin America and many developing countries, 
broadband providers offer social media plans that include talk, text, and access to selected 
social media services such as Facebook or Twitter, at a lower price than a traditional mobile 
data plan. In Canada, upstart wireless provider TELUS has partnered with Microsoft to offer a 
Skype-optimized mobile plan. And French provider Orange sought to expand in the United 
Kingdom by bundling Internet access with the customer’s choice from a menu of available 
online services such as news, streaming video, or music. A rule limiting consumers to a “dumb 
pipe” connection would inhibit American consumers’ ability to partake of this global revolution 
currently taking place for broadband services, particularly in the mobile space. 
 
Given increasingly diverse consumer needs and the growth of international models showing 
alternative ways to serve customers more effectively, it is odd to see advocates pushing for less 
diversity and less choice among American broadband providers – yet that has been the goal of 
the net neutrality movement. And having successfully limited American broadband innovation 
in the Open Internet order, advocates are now pushing the FCC to close two of the few 
remaining avenues that the order left open: usage-based pricing and zero-rated services. The 
Commission has acknowledged strong arguments both for and against both practices. 
Admittedly, each is susceptible to anticompetitive abuse, as are many other business decisions 
by providers throughout the Internet ecosystem. But it would be a mistake to counter that risk 
with per se rules that would pull the reins of innovation even tighter and deprive consumers of 
alternatives to the status quo. 
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III. Usage-Based Pricing 
 
Usage-based pricing has become a flashpoint in post-Open Internet order broadband policy 
discussions (where it often goes by the loaded and inaccurate term “data caps”). It has emerged 
as an alternative pricing strategy to the traditional unlimited flat-rate model. Its growth has 
been most prominent in the mobile sector, where tiered service plans helped solve the capacity 
problems created by the smartphone revolution. But several fixed broadband providers are also 
finding usage-based pricing to be a tool to segment their customer bases more intelligently. 
 
I have discussed usage-based pricing at length in an earlier Free State Foundation Perspectives 
publication.11 There is nothing inherently anti-consumer or anticompetitive about the practice. 
It simply represents a different way that a provider might spread its network costs across its 
customer base. The unlimited flat-rate model charges each customer the same amount 
regardless of use. As the Commission noted in its 2010 rules, “[r]equiring all subscribers to pay 
the same amount for broadband service, regardless of the performance or usage of the service, 
would force lighter end users of the network to subsidize heavier end users.”12 Usage-based 
pricing mitigates this problem by shifting more network costs onto those who use the network 
the most.  
 
Critics charge that usage-based pricing can be a tool for anticompetitive behavior. Specifically, 
they fear that cable companies may adopt usage-based pricing to deter competition from over-
the-top video providers such as Netflix and Hulu. Because Internet-based video consumes 
significant amounts of data, a customer that replaces traditional cable with an Internet-based 
alternative would experience a significant increase in monthly data consumption – and may not 
make the switch if this meant a significant increase in the monthly broadband bill. 
 
These critics are correct that some broadband providers may have incentives to engage in 
anticompetitive behavior – though it’s worth noting that many broadband providers (including 
DSL and wireless companies) do not have cable affiliates, and many that do (such as Verizon) 
do not engage in usage-based pricing. But the mere risk of anticompetitive harm alone is 
insufficient to ban a practice, especially in light of the procompetitive justifications for such a 
practice. What matters is whether the practice actually causes consumer harm. If, for example, 
a fixed broadband provider enforced a hard monthly limit – a true “data cap” – set near or 
below the amount of data a typical Netflix consumer would use, and if the consumer had no 
other alternatives for broadband service, the practice might warrant investigation. But most 
fixed usage-based plans are far more mild. Comcast, for example, is test marketing a 300GB 
monthly plan, with a modest $10 charge for each 50GB above that initial amount. This is 
hardly a “cap” on monthly service. It is, instead, a use-agnostic way to assure that those who 
use more data assume a greater share of the network’s total cost. 
 
The real culprit in the anticompetitive scenarios spun by critics is not usage-based pricing; it’s 
market power. A broadband company with market power does not need usage-based pricing to 
punish cord-cutters; it could simply raise the price of the traditional flat-rate plan to compensate 
for the lost revenue. Similarly, a company using speed tiers (a practice that Public Knowledge 
and others have endorsed as an acceptable form of price discrimination) could set the basic tier 
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below the speed necessary for HD streaming, and charge a significant premium for HD-capable 
speeds. In each case, the effect on competition would turn on a highly fact-specific inquiry into 
the broadband provider’s market power and the effect that the pricing strategy has on various 
parts of the provider’s customer base.  
 
But absent proof of anticompetitive harm, broadband companies should be free to experiment 
with alternative pricing strategies. Consumers benefit from having a variety of broadband 
access models from which to choose. Consider, for example, the tiered pricing structure of 
most major postpaid wireless plans. Heavier users can choose plans with higher thresholds 
before overage charges occur, which translates to a lower price per gigabyte. Lighter users, by 
comparison, can choose smaller plans with a lower monthly fee. Forcing them both into a one-
size-fits-all access plan could be detrimental to both and could increase the digital divide, as 
some cost-conscious customers would reject an unlimited plan at the unlimited price yet would 
be willing to pay a smaller price for limited monthly access.  
 
IV. Zero-Rated Traffic 
 
Similarly, several net neutrality advocates seek to prohibit zero-rating of broadband traffic. 
“Zero-rating” is the practice of allowing customers to consume particular Internet content or 
services without incurring charges against their monthly data plans. The idea is popular with 
some edge providers eager to distribute their content to a wider range of consumers. Wikipedia, 
for instance, has been an unabashed champion of zero-rating, forging partnerships with carriers 
in several developing countries to make its knowledge base available for free to anyone with an 
Internet-ready phone. The Wikipedia Zero project, modeled on a similar initiative by Facebook, 
won a 2013 SXSW Interactive Award for activism.13 
 
Net neutrality advocates fear zero-rated traffic for the same reason they sought net neutrality 
regulation. They fear that the ability to partner with carriers to better deliver edge content to 
consumers will favor well-capitalized edge providers. According to this theory, companies that 
can afford to zero-rate their services will gain a competitive advantage over those that cannot. 
And as with usage-based pricing, broadband providers might use zero-rating to give their 
affiliated services an advantage over Internet-based competitors. 
 
Of course, zero-rating of traffic is hardly the most significant part of the Internet ecosystem 
where well-capitalized companies have an advantage over their competitors. For example, large 
companies such as Google and Microsoft have built huge server farms to cache and distribute 
their content locally rather than deliver their services over the public Internet. Others like 
Netflix rely upon private content-delivery networks (or construct their own CDNs). By paying 
to bypass the public Internet, these companies gain more control over delivery of their product 
and are less susceptible to congestion, packet loss, and other pitfalls that plague their 
competitors who cannot afford these alternative delivery models. More basically, Netflix and 
Amazon are paying millions to develop their own content and to be the exclusive online 
provider of certain third-party content, striking deals that other video delivery services simply 
cannot afford to pay. These give them an advantage – but few would say such deals “skew edge 
provider competition.” Rather, most would simply call this “competition.” 
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Similarly, zero-rating plans can improve consumer choice and increase competition. Zero-
rating of traffic enhances a consumer’s broadband plan. Rather than purchasing a bucket of 
minutes each month, the consumer gets a bucket of minutes plus unlimited access to zero-rated 
content for the same price. By zero-rating certain traffic, a broadband provider can differentiate 
itself from its competitors, thus increasing the number of planes of competition among carriers. 
A carefully-targeted zero-rating plan can target niche customers whose needs are imperfectly 
met by traditional plans, and who are better off with free unlimited access to the content they 
value most.  
 
And importantly, zero-rating can improve competition among edge providers as well. AT&T 
offers a sponsored data program, where any interested edge provider can include an API 
(“application program interface”) that zero-rates app traffic by allowing the edge provider to 
pay the charges the customer would otherwise incur – a practice that Professor Babette Boliek 
has likened to couponing in cyberspace. Zero-rated agreements are not the exclusive 
prerogative of richer edge companies. They can also provide opportunities for newer or smaller 
startups to make a significant promotional splash. For example, when French streaming music 
service Deezer sought to enter the British market, it partnered with smaller wireless provider 
Orange, making Deezer one of the options in Orange’s Swapables service. As noted above, the 
agreement gave Orange a point of differentiation over its wireless rivals. But it also gave 
upstart Deezer built-in delivery over the Orange network, easy access to Orange’s customer 
base, and low-cost promotional marketing as part of the Swapables program.14 The partnership 
allowed Deezer the foothold that it needed to begin taking on market leader Spotify. 
 
T-Mobile: Music Freedom, Binge On 
 
T-Mobile has been the most active American carrier to explore the benefits of zero-rating, and 
its experiments offer keen insight into the potential benefits of the practice. T-Mobile is smaller 
than rivals AT&T and Verizon and lacks many advantages that scale can bring, such as greater 
network capacity and spectrum licenses. In a head-to-head battle for customers over a 
homogenous product, it is likely to lose, because it cannot match its rivals’ lower costs of 
business (a fact that Sprint is perhaps demonstrating). So to grow, the company has diversified 
its product to attract customers dissatisfied by traditional offerings from the larger carriers – 
most notably by zero-rating traffic from streaming music providers. The company recognized 
that a large niche of consumers regularly stream music to mobile devices and would be 
attracted to a plan that allows them to do so free. More recently, the company has extended the 
idea to streaming video through its Binge On promotion, using an algorithm that compresses 
video to SD quality to optimize delivery over the T-Mobile network.15  
 
Although many advocates have condemned T-Mobile’s innovative business model, none has 
yet accepted the FCC’s invitation to ask whether the service violates the awkwardly-worded 
“no unreasonable interference/disadvantage” standard. This is likely because the Commission 
would almost certainly find the practice reasonable. T-Mobile is the third-largest provider in a 
scale-driven industry. It lacks market power and is in no position to extract super-competitive 
profits or otherwise harm consumers. Unlimited streaming music (or video) is appealing to a 
large niche of consumers, who are better off with this option than without. Consumers 
uninterested in the options available (or uninterested in cross-subsidizing the binge viewing of 
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their fellow customers) can choose a different plan or a different carrier. T-Mobile now offers a 
product that its rivals do not, which enhances competition among wireless providers. Moreover, 
the Commission noted that the CEO of upstart streaming service Grooveshark praised T-
Mobile’s program for helping make little-known offerings available to a wider customer base.16 
Perhaps for this reason, Chairman Tom Wheeler described T-Mobile’s offering as “highly 
innovative and highly competitive” and therefore “clearly” permissible under the Open Internet 
order.17  
 
Comcast: Stream TV 
 
Comcast’s Stream TV offers a different permutation on the zero-rating issue. Stream allows 
Comcast Internet customers access to live television from a dozen networks on laptops, tablets, 
and mobile devices within the customer’s home for $15/month.18 The service appears to target 
millennial “cord nevers” who are unlikely to sign up for traditional cable service and who 
increasingly prefer to watch video on Internet devices rather than on a traditional television set. 
A Comcast spokesperson recently clarified that in those markets where Comcast offers usage-
based pricing, Stream TV consumption does not count against the customer’s monthly data 
limits.19 
 
Initially, it’s important to note that Stream TV likely complies with the Open Internet order. As 
Comcast explained, Stream TV is not a video service delivered over the Internet, like Netflix or 
Hulu. Rather, it is an IP cable service delivered over the company’s managed cable network. 
The Commission explicitly exempted from the Open Internet order IP cable, facilities-based 
VoIP, and other application-level services that share capacity with broadband access, although 
it retained jurisdiction to examine whether individual offerings undermine investment, 
innovation, competition, or end-user benefits.20  
 
Nonetheless, critics argue that the Stream TV offering could “unfairly crush competitors and 
make it hard for consumers to get rival services from Netflix.”21 But the fact that some may 
choose Stream over Netflix is not alone sufficient reason to ban it. The question is not whether 
Stream is competitive, but whether it is unfairly competitive.  
 
If one considers Stream a substitute for online video like Netflix, then the objection seems 
obvious. Netflix video counts toward the customer’s monthly limit. Stream video does not. 
Therefore, given the choice, customers will choose Stream, which penalizes Netflix for not 
being zero-rated. 
 
But if Stream is instead a substitute for traditional cable, as Comcast suggests, the analogy 
begins to break down. After all, traditional cable viewing has never counted against a 
customer’s monthly data limit, and few, if any, critics argue it should be. And there is much to 
suggest that Stream is more like traditional cable than Netflix. Like cable, Stream offers a 
handful of linear cable channels, whereas Netflix and most online video rivals rely upon an on-
demand model. Like cable, Stream uses a separate part of the Comcast network for delivery, 
rather than the channels dedicated to broadband Internet access. And like cable, Stream is only 
available within the subscriber’s home, whereas most over-the-top video can be consumed 
wherever the customer has Internet access.  
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Netflix and other over-the-top providers have long thrived alongside traditional cable offerings, 
despite being subject to monthly data limits. Customers like that Netflix is cheaper than cable 
and available on multiple devices. Comcast has found a way for cable to match those 
advantages to meet the tastes of the next generation of video consumers. This new option is a 
boon, not a curse, for consumers, who now have more options to choose from. Importantly, 
customers who choose not to watch cable and rely entirely upon Netflix are no worse off now 
than they were before Stream appeared in the marketplace. But the competitive pressure of an 
improving cable product will push Netflix to continue to innovate and improve. While Comcast 
benefits from delivery over a dedicated network, that benefit stems from billions of dollars in 
infrastructure investment building networks to the home that its non-facilities-based 
competitors did not incur.   
 
V. Conclusion 
 
Usage-based pricing and especially zero-rating of traffic challenge the long-asserted notion that 
what’s good for edge providers is good for consumers. Some actions by broadband providers, 
or agreements between broadband and edge providers, might foreclose competition in the edge 
space. But antitrust scholar Herbert Hovenkamp notes that most vertical integration is “either 
competitively neutral or affirmatively desirable because it promotes efficiency.”22 Some may 
promote competition in the edge space, as Deezer and Grooveshark would testify. Others may 
promote greater competition in the broadband provider sector, as Music Freedom does. Or they 
may offer consumers more options, as Stream TV does. One cannot pass judgment on a class of 
business innovations based simply upon the generic effect it may have on one company. The 
regulator must instead engage in a careful study, on a case-by-case basis, of the overall effects 
that a particular practice may have on the market overall. 
 
This is perhaps why the Supreme Court has long warned that antitrust law protects 
“competition, not competitors.”23 Contrary to what often appears to be the FCC’s objective, the 
protection of edge providers should not be a goal in itself. It should be pursued only as a tool to 
protect consumers from harm. The Commission should allow broadband companies to 
experiment with innovative new offerings such as usage-based pricing and zero-rated traffic, 
because this experimentation is likely to give rise to consumer-beneficial alternatives to 
traditional broadband access models. Absent proof of anticompetitive harm, policy should 
promote innovation that enhances consumers’ ability to access the content and services they 
desire – no matter where in the Internet ecosystem this innovation occurs. 
  
* Daniel A. Lyons, an Associate Professor of Law at Boston College Law School, is a Member 
of the Free State Foundation’s Board of Academic Advisors. The Free State Foundation is an 
independent, nonpartisan free market-oriented think tank located in Rockville, Maryland. 
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